What we heard  during the very short trial that took place in Vatican City State last week showed how dangerous and careless it was to hire Paolo Gabriele for such a sensitive position. Recommended by Stanislao Dziwisz – now cardinal and archbishop of Cracow, previously John Paul II’s secretary – and by msgr. James Harvey – once assessor in the Vatican Secretariat of State and now prefect of the Pontifical House – Paolo Gabriele perfected over the years his knack for copying and stealing documents.  His version of events – that he began to gather documents in 2010, when the «Viganò’s affair» became public – contradicts the investigation’s findings. Georg Gaesnwein, Benedict XVI’s personal secretary, examined the papers. He noted that there were documents from 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. In their testimonies, the Vatican Gendarmes who searched Paolo Gabriele’s house confirmed that there were several documents taken before 2010. The Pope’s butler also maintained that he only took copies of documents. Facts denied it: there were several original documents in his house –everyone testifying  coincided on this.

Paolo Gabriele is not a scapegoat. He is certainly someone easy to take advantage of. It is so stated in both psychiatric examinations (the one requested by Paolo Gabriele’s lawyer and the one requested by the Vatican Promoter of Justice during the preliminary investigation) undertaken to analyze whether Paolo Gabriele was insano de mente or not. The butler knows and weighs the consequences of his actions. Yet in the psychiatric examination, Paolo Gabriele’s profile is that of an insecure person with a constant urge to meet with the approval of people he considered of a certain importance. During his testimony, Paolo Gabriele told how he used to take the car to go to work everyday, a mere 3-4 minutes commute on foot. Otherwise, he said, everybody could stop him to ask for favors, and he – being a good Christian – could not help but to listen and try to help everyone. Perhaps he took the car only to better hide the documents he stole.

When questioned, Paolo Gabriele almost brags. He says that he copied documents in front of everyone in his office – he had a desk in the room of the two Papal personal secretaries – because nobody would suspect him, since his intentions «were not evil». He explains that he «opened his heart» to Msgr. Gaenswein about his fears regarding the Vatican Gendarmes Corps. In fact, he has a sort of obsession with the Vatican Gendarmes. Somebody noted that it is the fixation of a person who could not become a Gendarme. Paolo Gabriele asks Gendarmes for copies of their regulations, he researches information about the Vatican Gendarme Corps, he reaches out to a certain Luca Catano – whom he though to be a magistrate – thinking he could get more information through him.

But the game Paolo Gabriele played during the trial is very odd. When he was held in custody, his lawyers declared that he was well and psychologically healthy. During the trial, he played the «torture card». Paolo Gabriele maintains that he was imprisoned for 20 days in a tiny cell, so narrow that he could not stretch his arms. He maintains that the light of his cell was kept on 24 hours a day. Giuseppe Della Torre, president of the Vatican Tribunal, opens an investigation about this «tortures». Members of the Vatican Gendarmes Corps are shocked. They treated Paolo Gabriele with kid gloves, and the butler had even thanked them. They deliver a press communiqué, responding point by point to each of Gabriele’s accusations. They counter the possibility of facing further accusations. The day after Paolo Gabriele’s interrogation, Vice Commissioner Cintia was called to testify, and asked that the court record note that «Paolo Gabriele thanked me». To which Paolo Gabriele reacts with a wide smile.

Paolo Gabriele’s defensive line is also questionable. It intends to show that the Pope’s butler was framed. His lawyer Arru insistently raised questions: about the use or not use of gloves during the search in his house (although for «paper searches there is no need for gloves»), about the search in Gabriele’s house in Castel Gandolfo, in Italian territory (although this search is not part of the trial); about the fact that the boxes where all of Paolo Gabriele’s things were placed were perhaps too large, insinuating there were originally more documents than those later considered necessary.  All this calling into question is to support the scapegoat thesis, where Paolo is the victim to a conspiracy. He is the hero framed, who takes the blame calmly.

Paolo Gabriele is not a hero. He is just one of many Vatican employees. Many of them handle documents. Not all of them steal documents. Many of them can have questions about situations, even be shocked. But they try to be loyal to the institution they have been sworn into. It is also true that others would do what Paolo Gabriele did, maybe to earn some extra-money, or for other reasons. There is, in fact, a «gang of malcontents», a sort of group made up of Vatican clerks and prelates. They do not hide their discontent, and they often speak about how to «help the Pope», which means to stir trouble for the Pope.

The existence of this gang of malcontents proves that the Vatican old boys’ club system has failed. Over the years, clerks, officials and even priests poorly selected were hired in the Vatican, and then have been able to advance in their careers, step by step. Mediocre people were able to reach very senior posts, and then co-opted people similar to them. There are almost three such generations. The Vatican must really overhaul its hiring practices.

Gabriele has even mentioned an enabling environment. Who swayed Paolo Gabriele? He talks about cardinals Sardi and Comastri; about Joseph Ratzinger’s long-term collaborator Ingrid Stampa; about Msgr. Cavina, bishop of Carpi, who served for a long time as an official in the Vatican Secretariat of State. The first three – together with Joseph Clemens, whom Paolo Gabriele oddly did not mention – were said to be the Vatileaks inspirers in an article in Die Welt which influenced public opinion (this article was excerpted from the trial, on Paolo Gabriele’s lawyer request). This article – whose contents were officially denied by the Vatican Secretariat of State – was excluded from the process on request by Paolo Gabriele’s lawyer. The butler drops these names, and then distance himself from the consequences. The day after giving testimony, Cristiana Arru maintains that the butler is «bothered» by the fact that the media has referred to these people as his accomplices.

Perhaps, one should look for Paolo Gabriele’s enabling environments elsewhere. Much higher, and also in everyday meeting places. Perhaps in some of the bars around the Vatican where the gang of malcontents gather to complain, and where a cardinal could casually pat someone on the shoulder and let him know that he can be a hero, that he can play a role to save the Pope from his obtuse collaborators. Who seduced Paolo Gabriele? Who had reasons to do so? Many are those who may have a grudge against this Pontificate, and against Bertone, Secretary of State. After almost 30 years, the machine of privileges was dismantled by the Pope and Bertone. They re-built the structures, and gave power to other people.

Once, these internal struggles took place inside the Vatican, invisible outside the Sacred Walls. The loyalty to the institution came above all. There was great consciousness about the importance of the Church in the world. That is no longer the case.

Vatileaks shed light on how prelates often put their personal interests before the Church’s interests. The sense of being Church has been lost. Careerism has grown – and it is not a case that the Pope held several speeches and homily blaming careerism. Much could be learned from the report of the cardinals’ commission appointed by the Pope to investigate how the documents were leaked. The three cardinals –Herranz, Tomko and De Giorgi—looked into the «enabling environment». They reached some conclusions, which they shared personally with the Pope. The issue is not whether someone would like to see Pope Benedict XVI killed or marginalized. The real problem is indifference toward the Church. The scant understanding of its mission, reducing it to a mere power structure. This is why Vatileaks is not over.  It may never be.

After the no confidence vote. The words of Gotti Tedeschi

After receiving a no confidence vote by the IOR Board of Superintendence, Ettore Gotti Tedeschi became part of the investigation on the Italian defense company Finmeccanica. He is not charged with any crime, but he is suspected to have stored documents of Finmeccanica CEO Fernando Orsi. As Gotti Tedeschi, Orsi hails from Piacenza. They are long-time friends. That is why Gotti Tedeschi’s house in Piacenza and his office in Milan were searched. The police took 47 folders, that are said to contain Gotti Tedeschi’s private documents – and not IOR correspondence. These folders are now in the hands of the Public Prosecutor of Naples investigating Finmenccanica. The Public Prosecutor of Naples sent to the Public Prosecutor of Rome some of the documents. The Public Prosecutor of Rome is still investigating 23 million euro transferred by the IOR in September 2010 (20 million were transferred from a IOR account to a branch of Credito Artigiano and 3 million from a IOR account to Banco del Fucino toward a IOR account to a JpMorgan branch in Frankfurt). Gotti Tedeschi has been questioned by both Public Prosecutors. On the one hand – according to the press – he said he wanted to be discreet and not to speak about the IOR in order not to cause pain to the Pope (he insistently has asked for a private audience with Benedict XVI); on the other hand, he reportedly said that there had been opposition to him for his commitment to transparency, his desire not to have any more cipher accounts in the IOR, and his work to add the IOR to the list of virtuous banks compiled and monitored by the Bank of Italy.  On this, he would have had the collaboration of Anna Maria Tarantola, then number two of the vigilance in the Bank of Italy and now general manager-elect of Italy’s public broadcaster, RAI Television.

IOR transparency

These allegations  are a strong blow to the IOR image. But they are not true. One telling conversation – that is in some ways confirmed from what Paolo Cipriani, IOR general manager, recently told in an interview – even if no one will ever officially confirm it, offers insights.  When Ettore Gotti Tedeschi was still the president of the Institute, Paolo Cipriani, the IOR general manager, asked Gotti Tedeschi to show him where the cipher accounts were, since Tedeschi had been repeatedly calling for their closing. Gotti Tedeschi, angry, did not want to identify which accounts he was talking about and said: «There are such accounts, the Bank of Italy told me about them». Cipriani explained the IOR security and transparency procedures in an interview to the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera. The policy of the Institute changed in 2002, when the KYC procedures was first and scrupulously applied. KYC stands for «know your customer», and involves a thorough screening of customers.

The IOR has always maintained informal but close cooperation with the Guardia di Finanza, i.e. the Italian financial police. The cooperation is so strong that it is told that Paolo Cipriani once got a letter from the Guardia di Finanza, thanking him for the expediency and the precision of his information in response whenever Guardia de Finanza asked for anything. This was a relationship based on trust.  But the handling of the IOR. account at the JP Morgan branch in Milan did not follow this pattern.

The news of the closing of the account was made public the day after the press release of the second on-site visit to the Vatican of the MONEYVAL advisors. The press release acknowledged the steps forward taken by the Holy See.

Il Sole24Ore – the Italian newspaper that spread the news – claimed that the account was closed because the IOR was «unable to answer» requests for further information regarding some payments of the account to the branch of Milan – a peculiar account, which balance was brought to zero at the end of every day. JPMorgan also recalled that the bank activities of the branch are subject «both to the law of the Italian State and to internal regulations». That is why – after looking atthe IOR needs and the requirements imposed by Italian law and bank regulations – JPMorgan reportedly did not think it had enough information to offer pay and cash services to the 1365 account. However, in fact, it was the IOR that closed the account. The decision to close it was in part also a response to the way in which Italian magistrates had asked for information about the account.

FIUs’ – Financial Intelligence Units –purpose is the exchange of internal information. When there is suspicion of money laundering, the bank alerts the vigilance of the Central Bank, which then alerts its financial intelligence unit. The alerts are kept anonymous, to protect the way that the systemprevents money laundering. These parameters are designed by the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, a «working group» of FIUs to improve cooperation in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and to help develop each State’s programs against money laundering.

The confidentiality of information is a key element in efforts to combat money laundering, as is also stated in Italy in the law 231/2007, that deals with the competences of the Bank of Italy. Art. 6 of the law says that «the FIU carries its functions with full autonomy and independence. To implement these principles, the Bank of Italy regulates the organization and the functioning of the FIU, including the confidentiality of the information collected. The Bank of Italy provides the FIU with financial means and other adequate resources to insure the efficient pursuit of its institutional goals».

In the case of the closing of the JPMorgan account, none of the standard procedures were followed: the Rome’s Public Prosecutor directly alerted the FIU of the Bank of Italy; the FIU then alerted the vigilance of the Bank of Italy; and the vigilance asked the JPMorgan branch information on the account. But, if the public prosecutors want to investigate an account, they must do it through the Guardia di Finaza. Yet, Ettore Gotti Tedeschi maintained that there were valid reasons why  JPMorgan closed the IOR account of its Milan branch. Gotti Tedeschi’s lack of initiative to defend the Institute was noticed by the IOR Board of Superintendence in the now famous meeting of May, 24, when the board passed the no confidence resolution on its president.

The 24 May board of Superintendence

Usually, the meeting of the Council of Superintendence – called on trimestral basis – are divided in two parts: during the first part – that lasts about half an hour – the members of the Board meet; only after – and this is the second part – Paolo Cipriani, general manager of the Institute, enters, and reports on technical aspects and bank operations of the previous semester.

On May 24, Cipriani had to wait two and a half hours. When he was called by the board, Ettore Gotti Tedeschi had already left the meeting, and the no confidence vote had already taken place. The memorandum was already drafted by Carl A. Anderson, who was the secretary of the Board.

Gotti Tedeschi – as written in the memorandum – began the meeting, and spoke for about 70 minutes. After his speech, the members of the board raised some issues. They remarked to the president his unjustified absence to the last two scheduled meetings of the board (on February, 24 and April, 17). The absence to the last meeting was very disappointing: it was the meeting when the board approved the balances and the earnings to be allocated to the Pope. The IOR, in fact, is not a bank, and its fund are at the Papal disposal. Rumors says that Gotti Tedeschi was in Rome, and he was invited to join the meeting. He did not go.

The board also raised with Gotti Tedeschi news leaks. Among the several documents of the institute leaked to the press in the previous months, there was an e-mail sent by Francesco De Pasquale (general manager of the Authority for Financial Information, so formally a controller) to Ettore Gotti Tedeschi (formally, one of the ones controlled) that complained about the ramifications of the Vatican anti-money laundering law – the law n. 127.  The law had been amended as per MONEYVAL recommendations, and this had sparked a lively debate inside the Vatican.   The e-mail – the members of the board noticed – could have only been leaked by Ettore Gotti Tedeschi’s office.

Last key issue, the closing of the JPMorgan account: why did the president not defend the Institute from the attacks and the inaccuracies of the press? It was then that Gotti Tedeschi, angry, abandoned the meeting. It was – for the members of the board – the climax of a tense and overdue situation. In order to manage thecontroversy,it was decided to publicly release the memorandum of the meeting.

On May, 25 – the day after the no confidence motion– the IOR Commission of Cardinals was convoked to decide how to manage the new situation. Only Card. Odilo Scherer could not be part of the meeting, while Card. Telesphore Toppo arrived right in time from India. In that meeting, the cardinals decided how would Gotti Tedeschi be let go from the institute.

What will follow

While awaiting how the investigation would proceed, and as soon as the news of the «memorandum» of Gotti Tedeschi spread, the Holy See released a press communiqué in which it maintained that it trusted that «the prerogatives acknowledged to the Holy See by the international legal order are being adequately considered and respected by the Italian judicial authorities». It is a clear statement: the Holy See reminds all that those are documents from a sovereign country, seized from an ex president of a «body of State».

To think that this would be of detriment to the evaluation of the Holy See Transparency by the Council of Europe would be wrong. It seems MONEYVAL evaluated the IOR «largely compliant» with international standards.  It was just part of the evaluation. The evaluation is not just about the IOR.  It includes the 120 Vatican bodies that deals with budgets and financial transfers.

Holy See financial transparency. Risks and procedures.

It is worth to clarify some assertions made in the last few days. These assertions had partially come out from the same environment that defended Ettore Gotti Tedeschi. They claim that the Holy See risks not to be added to the white list of the virtuous States in terms of prevention of money laundering; the Holy See has been selected to undergo MONEYVAL inspections; and that the Holy See does not want to cooperate with Italian authorities. But these statements are false or grossly inaccurate. It is thus worthwhile to be  very thorough, and explain everything step by step.

White list

Let us begin with the so-called «white list» issue. MONEYVAL – the body of the Council of Europe that evaluates the adherence to the anti-money laundering norms of Council of Europe State members – does not have a white list. MONEYVAL is a body where peer-to-peer evaluations of member States takes place. There are no inspections. There are processes of mutual evaluation. And these evaluations are part of an on-going process. After the plenary assembly of MONEYVAL – 2-6 of July – the report about the Holy See will be public. The draft of this report was first discussed in Strasbourg, during the meeting between Holy See officials and MONEYVAL evaluators in May. Some weaknesseshave been noted. But these weaknesses often deal with the fact that the Holy See is a peculiar State. MONEYVAL reports are divided in three parts: legal, financial and law enforcement. The evaluators rate the adherence to each GAFI recommendation (40+9 until February, now 40, with several novelties). Rating can be: non-compliant, partially compliant, largely compliant or compliant. Of the GAFI recommendations, 16 are «key and core». Of these 16 key and core recommendations, the Holy See – according to the press – would be partially compliant or non-compliant in 8. Obviously, this could change after discussionsat the plenary assembly. If it got 10 negative ratings, the evaluation of the Holy See adherence to international standards would be then assigned to the GAFI International Cooperation Review Group, and so it would take more time to be evaluated largely compliant. There are also infringement procedures on particular ratings. In 2005, Italy was evaluated generally largely compliant. At the same time, there were – in the Mutual Evaluation Report – several non compliant or partially compliant ratings. After two years, the GAFI closed the infringement procedure.

The meetings with the evaluators.

In fact, there is no intention to vote out a State. And the fact that there are 8 points to discuss does not necessarily lead to a general negative rating. The meetings with the MONEYVAL evaluators are characterized by an open discussion. The Holy See could eventually challenge the rating, and explain to the evaluators the reason for some of its peculiarities. The procedure is very well defined in several steps. During the plenary assembly of MONEYVAL, at least one whole day will be dedicated to discuss the draft report about the Holy See/Vatican City State. Three countries must canvass each of the three parts of the report. Then, the assembly as a whole will hold an open discussion. At the end of this discussion, the draft report could be amended. The final decision will be taken by all the delegates that will take part in the plenary assembly in July.

This will not lead directly to the Holy See being added to the white list. There is not a white list that is directly linked to the MONEYVAL evaluation. The white list generally refers to the Common Understanding – i.e. the criteria (defined by the EU. regulation 2005/60/EC) used by EU members about efforts against money laundering. A country is added to this white list only if sponsored by a member State, and only after getting a positive evaluation on its AML/FT (Anti Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism) policies by an independent and authoritative international body. This white list is not perfect or definitive. For example, the list of virtuous countries published every year by the American Secretary of State follows a different approach. Another aspect of this white list is that States can acknowledge the European white list, and still consider a particular country not trustworthy. For example, Italy has excluded Switzerland from Italy’s white list.

Financial transparency is never ending

Even if MONEYVAL will positively rate the Holy See/Vatican City State, the path to transparency will not stop there. MONEYVAL has already done three evaluation rounds, and at this time some countries are being evaluated for a «follow up round», i.e. a fourth round that – beyond the implementation of specific GAFI recommendations – takes into consideration statistics and effectiveness of the legislation adopted by the member States. The first evaluation round took place in 1998-2000, the second in 2001-2004 and the third in 2005-2009. The Holy See became a MONEYVAL member on April 6^th 2011, and it was promptly admitted to the third evaluation round, that looks at the legislation of a country and the international  standards – for example, if the countries evaluated signed and ratified the Palermo and Wien conventions.

MONEYVAL on site visits to the Vatican

MONEYVAL evaluators went for the first time for an on site visit to the Vatican on November, 21-26. The evaluators assess the legislative situation of the countries incombating money laundering. The result of the visit is reserved to the counterpart: it is a report that shows the key findings of the evaluators and that rates the adherence of the country evaluated to each GAFI recommendation. After the completion of the report, the evaluated country has two months to implement the MONEYVAL recommendations.

On January, 25 2012, with the decree n. 59, the Holy See amended its anti-money laundering law n. 127, following MONEYVAL recommendations, and making it more compliant with international standards. That same day, the Holy See signed and ratified the conventions of New York, Wien and Palermo: this was proof of a long-term commitment to financial transparency. The new law was substantially different from the old one, and outlined a better power distribution. The control of Vatican finances was not exclusively entrusted to the one and only Authority for Financial Information. The amendment of the law was the focus of a strong internal debate, and some – in primis Card. Attilio Nicora, president of the Authority for Financial Information – defined the new law «a step back». In fact, the Holy See followed the MONEYVAL recommendations. Jeffrey Owens, head of tax issues at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, praised the Holy See’s reforms. «The Vatican is heading in the right direction with the revised norms», he said to the Associated Press.

This amendment profoundly changed the Vatican legislative scenario. That is why there was the need for a second on site visit of MONEYVAL evaluators, that took place March 14 to 16 . This visit was not an inspection: it was an assessment of progress. After this second evaluation, the draft report was completed and sent out to the Holy See in April. In May – from the 14th to 16th – a delegation of the Holy See went to Strasbourg to comment on the report and get it ready to be presented to the next plenary assembly. Now, a pre-meeting will probably be held before the plenary assembly of July. And finally, the plenary assembly in July, where a decision will be taken: will the Vatican be subjected to an infringement process? Or will its efforts be awarded? « I have not seen any State – a MONEYVAL evaluator said informally to a Vatican official – going so quickly toward the financial transparency, and making so many changements». These words confirms the Strasbourg appreciation for the Holy See job. Neverthless the difficulties, one could also preview a positive MONEYVAL evaluation. And this would be gained in a very short time.

Sheriff, in this story, is msgr. Carlo Maria Viganò, now Papal nuncio to the United Stated. From 2009 on he has been general secretary of the Vatican City State Administration. His previous post was as head of personnel in the Vatican Secretariat of State. Even from as head of personnel, he discontented many. For example, he wanted all the depeneants to clock in and out. That is when the shooting of sheriff is planned, with the logic and lucidity that just the small worlds can have. And Vatican is unquestionably a small world.

Carlo Maria Viganò’s story swept the world. The letters he addressed to Pope Benedict XVI and to card. Bertone, Vatican secretary of State, to denounce the «corruption » in procurements of Vatican City State administration had been profusely highlighted by the media. His move to the post of Papal Nuncio in Washington has been described as a punishment, a promoveatur ut amoveatur case as many have been in history – and not just Vatican history. Yet, no one seems to be innocent in this story. Viganò is not, since he claims for himself to be promoted as president of the Vatican City State Administration – a position that would pave the way for a red birretta; the «bankers» – as Viganò calls in the letters the members of  “Finance and Management Committee” made up of the bankers Pellegrino Capaldo, Carlo Fratta Pasini, Massimo Ponzellini, and Ettore Gotti Tedeschi (the last of these went on to become the president of the Institute for Works of Religion) -  , manager of procurements in Vatican City State are not, since they appear ready to sideline the Vatican interests for the sake of their lucrative exploitation; and the Vatican Secretariat of State is not – it seems to lack in management.

While the Viganò affair was highlighted in the media, card. Bertone was preparing the meeting of the heads of Vatican departments (Prefectures and Pontifical Councils) about the «Process of elaboration, publishing and reception of the documents of the Holy See». During his introductive speech, Bertone pointed at the encroach of the «passion for the little news of ecclesiastical gossip, that undermines the Holy See prestige and sometimes crab the climate of confidence and trust among the Holy See’s bodies». During the meeting, nobody talked about the Viganò’s case. But Bertone’s words showed fairly that the Vatican Secretary of State – together with the Pope that presided the meeting – is working to bring some order in the Roman Curia.

Yet, there is something rotten about the whole story. Too many questions remain unanswered. The most important one: why have Viganò’s letters been delivered outside the Vatican? And why had the Viganò’s letter so profusely highlighted in the media? There is one theory above all, collected within the Vatican walls: at the time when the Holy See has rewritten its 2010 anti-money laundering law after European inspectors found that it didn’t fully meet their tough standards to combat the financing of terrorism, Viganò’s case is depicted in a way that can be outlined as an attempt to the sovereignty of Vatican City State, «that small piece of land – Pope Pius XII used to say – that permits us to accomplish to our mission». Since Vatican City State is a sovereign entity. It has its own legislation. It has its Court. It has its police corps, the Vatican Gendarmerie. No allegation remains unaccomplished, inside the Vatican.

Four letters – addressed by msgr. Viganò to Benedict XVI and to card. Bertone – has been leaked to the press. In one of these letters, Viganò denounces the counterfeiting of bills and shortfalls, hidden robberies in the pontifical villas, and he names the informers that inspired a series of articles – signed by no one – published in the Italian newspaper Il Giornale, in which Viganò’s was put under accusation. According to Viganò’s, those articles were inspired by msgr. Nicolini, then administrative director of Vatican Museums. Viganò attributes to Nicolini the «counterfeiting of bills» and a cash deficit, a «participation interest» in companies defaulting to the Government «for at least two million two hundred thousand Euros and that, prior to that he had defrauded L’Osservatore Romano for over ninety-seven thousand Euros, and APSA for more than eighty-five thousand». Viganò also accused Nicolini of «arrogance and bullying towards employees who do not show absolute subservience to him, preferences, promotions and arbitrary hirings done for personal purposes». Then, Viganò points at the denigration on him brought on by Marco Simeon, head of the Foreign Relations of Rai – the Italian State television – and of Rai Vaticano (the branch of Rai news that covers the Vatican), a man that – «according to the press» – Viganò writes – is linked to card. Bertone.

On the basis of Viganò’s allegations against Nicolini, an internal investigation was carried out in the Vatican, headed by a disciplinary committee. The committee has listened to the witnesses mentioned in the prelate’s dramatic letters. As for the anonymous articles in Il Giornale, the committee concluded the «indemonstrability» of Viganò’s accusations, while after the investigations, other allegations about Mgr. Nicolini have also proved unfounded, even if the committee retained that it had encountered the qualities mentioned about his character and suggested that measures be taken.

No allegation remains unaccomplished within the Vatican walls. Vatican is a sovereign entity, but it is also a whole different world. Let us see how this long-time planned sheriff’s homicide took place. Let us get back to the time when Viganò is working in the Vatican secretariat of State.

At the beginning of 2009, abbé Claude Barthe writes the conclusions of his fact-finding mission in the bimonthly Catholic French magazine L’Homme Nouveau. Barthe includes Viganò and his nephew Carlo Maria Polvani, head of the information office of the Secretariat of State, among the Curial frondeurs that row against the Pope and Bertone. Some maligns that it was Polvani that delivered Viganò’s letters outside the Vatican.

Once in the administration of Vatican City State, Viganò tries to change the cemented mechanisms of building maintenance procurements and of management of Vatican Gardens. Many people acknowledge that he made a worthy job. But they also remember that «he was despotic, and he did not take in consideration the Vatican office balances». In 2010, a new campaign against Viganò takes place: a series of e-mails are sent to cardinals and Papal nuncios, accusing Viganò to favor his nephew Polvani’s career. And then, in 2011, Il  Giornale publishes the article by anonymous that are cipher to let understand that the time of Viganò’s in Vatican City State is over. Isolated and strained, Viganò began writing letters to the top of hierarchy. The strain increased, and the Pope and Bertone needed to re-balance the situation. It was the time when they decided to send Viganò to the prestigious nunciature in Washington. More than a promoveatur ut amoveatur, it is a way to «save the life» to Viganò, that has more enemies than ever.

When all seems lost, Viganò writes to Benedict XVI. The paradox of this story is that Viganò, in the end, relies to the moral authority of the Church, that is embodied by Benedict XVI. «In spite of the great damage to my reputation – Viganò writes to the Pope in July, 7th 2011 – and the negative repercussions that this provision will provoke, my response cannot be anything but full adherence to the will of the pope, as I have always done during my other than brief service to the Holy See. In the face of this harsh trial as well, I renew with profound faith my absolute obedience to the Vicar of Christ».